The Anglo-Zulu War was a typical war of resistance to the imposition of colonial rule. Thirty years ago and more, historians of Africa attempted to distinguish specific patterns of reaction to colonial conquest. One school of thought recognized several distinct stages of response, the first being that of 'primary resistance'. This was defined as a movement of resistance to the initial European occupation led by traditional leaders supported by their formal instruments of power, such as their armies.
4 Though so long current, this concept is still appropriate when considering the options open to the Zulu leadership engulfed by the invasion crisis of 1879.
Ross Hassig, in his illuminating study on Aztec warfare, reminds us that its practice (so strange and even repugnant to a contemporary mind)
was nevertheless a logical exercise in political power to secure the integrity of the state, explicable in strategic terms and possessing a rationality as accessible as our own is to us. 5 So it was with the Zulu response to the threat of the British invasion. After all, as Geoffrey Best has argued, human society, once politically organised, becomes a state, and states distinguish themselves from other states by their ability to fight in order to further their own interests or to protect themselves fi'om one another.
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A war, then, is a function of state politics, and marks the conviction by a state that it c~n impose its will on another most effectively through fighting. Yet war is of a reciprocal nature, for the aggressors's assumptions about possession of a relative advantage are matched by others held by the prospective victim. If the latter should contemplate resistance, it is because it perceives that the hostile power threatens its own ability to control the environment securely. An environment on which its independent existence and the cultural values of its society depend.?
For a discussion of various categories of resistance. see J.P.e. Laband. 'The nature of the Indian Mutiny: a changing concept'. Theoria. XLVI (May 1976 Co/lapse. /8/5-1960 (Bungay, 1982 , p. 8.
See M. Howard, The Causes of Wars (London, 1983) , pp. 13. 18; M. Howard, 'Military power and the international order' in J. Garnett (ed.), Theories of Peace and Security (London. 1970) . p. 41; G. Blainey, The Causes of War (Melbourne, 1977) . pp. 104. 149-50; T.e. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven. 1966 impossible if the independence of the Zulu kingdom were to be maintained, and the social and economic system upon which the king's political power was based were not to be fatally subverted. Consequently, King Cetshwayo allowed the ultimatum to lapse unanswered on 11 January 1879, and employed the intervening thirty days of grace to perfect his strategic response to the impending invasion.
Lieutenant General Lord Chelmsford, who planned the British invasion, had put together an invading force of 17 929 men (5 476 of whom were British regulars) which he had divided into three main columns. These columns were to converge on oNdini, Cetshwayo's capital, and it was intended that during their advance they would entice the Zulu into risking one or more pitched battles. Once committed, the Zulu would discover to their cost (or so the British reckoned) that their superior numbers were no match for modem, well-trained troops and devastating tire-power of the British.
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To face this formidable threat, the Zulu possessed a military organisation that was on a militia basis and geared to short campaigns.
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This military system was built upon the institution of age-set units, or 'regiments', called amabllfho (singular -ibllfho) . Boys between the ages of fourteen and eighteen would gather at the various military homesteads (amakhanda, singular -ikhanda) , which were regional centres for royal intluence and mobilisation points for the amabllfho. There youths would serve for two to three years as cadets. Once enough boys of an age-group were congregated at the various amakhanda around the kingdom, the king would form them into a new ibllfho with orders to build a new ikhanda. A new ibllfho would serve continuously for seven to eight months immediately after formation, and thereafter for only a few months a year, leaving the men free for the rest of the year to attend to their own homesteads. Older men, once they had been given permission at about the age of thirty-five to marry, would perform their service at an ikhanda accompanied by their wives. While serving at an ikhanda. amabufho kept " " 4 For a discussion of Chelmsford's invasion plans. see John Laband (cd.) . Lord Chelt",ford 's Zululund Cuml'uigll 1878 -1879 (Stroud. 1994 The king learned from his deployment of spies in Natal, the Transvaal and Delagoa Bay, the precise strength and intentions of the British columns poised to invade his kingdom.
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Knowledge of the magnitude of the threat and the limits of his own resources caused Cetshwayo to cast around for potential allies. This was a perfectly natural response, for any belligerent, on contemplating the possibility of going to war, must assess how intervention by outside parties might affect the course of the impending conflict. Such predictions, especially if optimistic, will play an important part in military planning. Sotho had adopted new technologies and tactics over the years, and by the 1870s were adept with guns and horses in waging irregular warfare.
Why, pursued Etherington, should the Zulu by contrast have been so conservatively attached to the outmoded tactics of the I 830'S?34
There are, I believe, a number of answers to these conundrums. For a description of the Swazi campaigns and the civil wars of the 1840s and 1850s, see J.
Laband, Rope of Sand: The Rise and Fall of Ihe Zulu Kingdom in Ihe Nineleemh Century (Johannesburg, 1995), pp. 110, 116-18, 131-2, 142-6. For the probable ages of amabulho involved in the Anglo-Zulu War. see E.J. Krige, The Social Syslem oflhe Zulus (Pietermaritzburg, 1950 Sand, pp. 225, of the blockading army. But younger amabutho in particular, who were headstrong and highly competitive in their search for military glory, were notorious for their lack of restraint, and it would take exceptional skill and strength of will on a commander's part to bend them to such lacklustre operations. Furthermore, it was usual practice for a Zulu army to disperse immediately after action for the absolutely necessary purification ceremonies following the ritually polluting shedding of blood, to report their deeds to the king, to share out the booty, and to recuperate from fatigue, hunger and wounds. 44 The inevitability of such a dispersal after combat rendered it effectively impossible to concert strategy over a lengthy campaign; indeed, in 1879 the Zulu armies dispersed after each increasingly disheartening series of battles and had to be mustered again for the next round.
At the beginning of this paper I suggested that the victim of aggression will resist if more is to be gained through fighting than 
